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ABSTRACT 
We argue and empirically show on a sample of 270 unquoted, private equity backed 
companies that the shareholder structure of private companies influences the quality of their 
accounting information. We show that companies in which private equity (PE) investors have 
a higher equity stake produce accounting information that is of lower quality than companies 
in which PE investors have a lower equity stake, controlling for company size and age. We 
argue that this is evidence that a large equity stake is a substitute for high earnings quality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It is well documented that getting private equity1 (PE) has a profound influence on the 
way entrepreneurial companies operate. PE investors are active financial intermediaries 
(Bottazzi, da Rin and Hellmann, 2004), since they operate in an environment characterized by 
extensive information asymmetries and hence large problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Brander, Antweiler and Amit, 2002). Problems of illiquidity and non-diversifiability 
of their investments, creating high idiosyncratic and market risk, enhance the need for active 
oversight. 
 
Private equity investors have two distinct roles: that of monitoring the progress of the 
portfolio company and that of supporting the portfolio company, thereby creating value 
(Manigart and Sapienza, 1999). There is ample evidence that especially the highly respected 
PE firms have a positive contribution to their portfolio companies (Bottazzi et al., 2004): they 
give strategic, business and financial advice (Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir, 1996), they are 
instrumental in the recruitment of top management team members (Hellmann and Puri, 2002), 
and they act as a source of professional and industry contacts (Sapienza et al., 1996). PE 
backed companies contribute more to innovation (Kortum and Lerner, 2000) and put their 
products faster on the market than non-PE backed companies (Hellmann and Puri, 2000).  
 
Although our understanding of the value adding role of PE companies rapidly 
increases, relatively little is known on how they monitor the performance of their portfolio 
companies (Pruthi, Wright and Lockett, 2003; Beuselinck, Manigart and Van Cauwenberge, 
2005). The European Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (EVCA) Book of 
Guidelines (chapter 4, p. 40) states that “monitoring should allow the manager to confirm that 
the investment is progressing in accordance with the relevant business plan and should 
provide sufficient information to identify any failures to meet targets or milestones and to 
formulate remedial plans where necessary”.  
 
Monitoring is important for PE investors, as PE backed entrepreneurs have incentives 
to manipulate the short term performance of the venture, especially when the venture is 
performing poorly (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996) or when capital is invested in stages 
                                                           
1
 We define the term “private equity” as the provision of (quasi) equity to unquoted companies by professional 
intermediaries. Venture capital provided to early stage companies is thus a subset of private equity as defined 
here. 
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(Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). Hence, agency conflicts between entrepreneurs and investors 
may arise. Monitoring is also important for other stakeholders, as PE investors have a 
certifying role towards third parties such as banks, suppliers, customers and employees. 
Monitoring efforts by PE investors may create positive externalities for their portfolio 
companies, resulting in a higher level of professionalism (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). An 
important but often overlooked feature of the enhanced professionalism is the quality of 
financial reporting of portfolio firms (Beuselinck, Deloof and Manigart, 2004). Hand (2005), 
e.g., illustrates that monitoring efforts in a PE process indeed impacts the value relevance of 
financial statements of PE-backed companies, especially when they are more mature.  
 
PE investors acknowledge that one of their important roles is to organize a reliable 
internal and external control and audit system (Falconer, Reid and Terry, 1995; Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2004). Representatives of PE investors therefore often have a seat on the board of 
directors (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001) where the progress of the venture is regularly 
assessed. They further have informal contacts with the entrepreneur and key managers 
(Sapienza et al., 1996) and they require structured interim information between board 
meetings (Beuselinck, et al., 2005). This information is supplemented with ad-hoc 
communication when specific events take place. The focus of the control mechanisms is on 
the accounting and financial figures, rather than on the operational issues, especially for later 
stage portfolio companies (Falconer, et al., 1995; Beuselinck et al., 2005).  
 
This paper contributes to the rather novel literature on the interaction between PE 
governance and the quality of external financial reporting in unquoted companies. It has been 
shown that PE investors, as informed financial intermediaries, not only improve information 
production within the entrepreneurial company, but also influence the accounting information 
presented by their portfolio companies (Beuselinck et al., 2004). In this study, we examine the 
relation between PE shareholdership and the quality of financial reporting of their portfolio 
companies. We argue and empirically show on a sample of 270 unquoted PE backed Belgian 
companies that the quality of the accounting information presented by entrepreneurial 
companies depends on the equity percentage held by the PE investor. More specifically, the 
quality of the accounting information is highest when PE investors have low equity stakes, 
and the information quality decreases when the equity stakes of the PE investors is high.  
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We measure earnings quality through two of its vital attributes: the extent of earnings 
management and the timeliness of loss reporting. We define earnings management as the 
intentional modification of a firm’s performance by insiders to either mislead stakeholders or 
to influence contract terms. In general, more earnings management is associated with lower 
quality financial information (Francis et al., 2003). The second attributed used to study 
earnings quality, namely the timeliness of loss reporting, is a measure of the conservatism of 
the reported earnings. Reporting losses in a timely manner, rather than spreading the losses 
over future periods, is an additional indicator of earnings quality (Francis et al., 2003 ). 
 
Our findings are important, as different groups of stakeholders rely on accounting 
information provided by private companies. For banks, accounting information is important 
for credit decisions and for their monitoring of the entrepreneurial companies, but it is equally 
important for employees, suppliers and customers, as all these stakeholders are interested in 
the financial health of the focal company. Hence, knowing the corporate governance and 
shareholder structure of the company is important to assess the quality of the reported 
financial and accounting information. The current findings suggest that it is important for 
external stakeholders to consider the shareholder structure of unlisted firms since this 
inherently influences the quality of the disclosed financial reporting. This study is unique in 
that it is one of the first examinations of the extent of PE ownership and control and its impact 
on the financial reporting quality of portfolio companies. 
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Although most of the studies on earnings quality relate to publicly quoted companies, 
there is recent evidence that the quality of reported earnings of private companies is lower 
than that of quoted companies (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). This is explained by the 
observation that private companies have a lower need to produce high quality information, as 
they do not have to report to external shareholders and are not followed by financial analysts 
(Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Beuselinck et al. (2004) have shown, however, that the quality 
of reported earnings is higher for unlisted PE-backed companies than for comparable 
companies that did not receive PE. This is a consequence of the fact that PE investors have 
strong incentives to closely monitor the performance of their portfolio companies in order to 
minimize potential moral hazard problems between entrepreneurs and investors (Sapienza and 
Korsgaard, 1996; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). Enhanced monitoring by PE investors reduces 
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post-investment financial reporting flexibility and, as such, increases the quality of the 
reported earnings. While PE investors especially focus on the quality of the internally 
reported information (Falconer, et al., 1995; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004), one may argue 
that improved quality of internal information leads to improved quality of externally 
presented accounting information. Indeed, while presenting two sets of performance figures - 
one for internal use and one for external use - is common practice in large companies, this 
practice induces higher accounting and audit costs which may be excessive for small 
companies. High quality internal figures thus leads to high quality externally reported figures.  
 
We argue that PE ownership concentration, i.e. the equity percentage held by the PE 
investor in its portfolio company, influences the quality of the earnings reported by the 
portfolio company, due to the specific events and contractual relations that govern the PE 
process. First, given the nature of the contracts between the PE investors and the 
entrepreneurial companies, entrepreneurs have incentives to manipulate the short term 
performance of the venture, especially when the venture is performing poorly (Sapienza and 
Korsgaard, 1996; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). When predefined milestones are not achieved, 
PE investors often have the possibility to acquire a higher equity stake and more control in the 
company (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004) or deny further financing when financing is 
contracted in stages (Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). In order to minimize the probability of not 
attaining milestones, entrepreneurs may engage in earnings management activities. Hence, PE 
monitoring is a natural response to the agency problems inherent to this PE process and 
restrains the financial reporting flexibility of portfolio companies. Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2004) have shown that the higher the equity percentage that a PE investor holds in a portfolio 
company, the tighter the governance and control of the venture will be. To the extent that this 
increased governance is a complement of financial reporting quality, tighter control would 
lead to closer monitoring of the reported accounting figures in order to minimize agency 
conflicts between entrepreneurs and investors, and thus to increased earnings quality.  
 
Second, most portfolio firms have a high demand for additional external financing, as 
they are growth oriented, requiring large investments or are operating with negative cash 
flows. The initial PE investment is not sufficient to cover their external financing needs in 
most companies. Therefore, after having received PE, PE backed companies frequently issue 
significant amounts of bank debt or equity to the existing or to new investors (Baeyens and 
Manigart, 2005). Recent studies have shown that, in the long run, quoted companies are able 
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to attract more financing at better terms, leading to lower cost of capital and enhanced value, 
when the quality of the reported earnings is higher (Bharat, Sunder and Sunder, 2004; Francis 
et al., 2003). Given the professionalism of PE investors and given that they have more 
influence when holding larger equity stakes, a higher equity stake of the PE investor will lead 
to higher quality accounting information of the portfolio company. 
 
Foregoing arguments lead to Proposition 1:  
P1:  The quality of the reported earnings of a PE backed company is positively 
related to the equity percentage a PE investor holds.  
 
Alternatively, one may argue that the portfolio companies where the PE investors hold 
a higher equity percentage may have a lower quality of their reported earnings, because 
pursuing a policy of high quality financial reporting may result in significant costs for the 
portfolio companies. Following this reasoning, a high equity percentage substitutes for 
earnings quality, as the fact that the PE investor has a large equity stake in itself is already a 
positive signal towards external stakeholders, such as financiers or potential acquirers. 
Moreover, pursuing a high quality financial reporting potentially results in significant costs 
for the portfolio companies.  
 
First, high earnings quality may increase the cost of financing in the short run. By not 
managing the financial figures and recognizing losses in a timely manner, debt covenant 
restrictions are potentially violated, thereby leading to a higher cost and lower availability of 
financing. Reporting an upwardly managed performance and delaying loss reporting may 
enhance the short term probability of getting bank or equity financing at better terms and 
conditions (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) or may enable firms to avoid violations of their existing 
debt covenants, resulting in a lower (re)financing cost (DeFond and Park, 1994). The high 
external financing needs of PE backed companies may thus lead them to manage their 
earnings or delay reporting losses, thus resulting in a lower quality of their earnings. Given 
that a high equity ownership percentage of the PE investor may be a signal of the seriousness 
of the entrepreneurial venture towards external stakeholders, PE ownership concentration may 
substitute for high earnings quality.  
 
Second, the PE investors themselves may impact the reported earnings, as PE 
investors are exit oriented. They seek to sell their shares with considerable capital gains after 
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typically five to seven years. Typical exit routes for successful ventures are IPOs and trade 
sales, although the latter are more common in Continental Europe (EVCA, yearbooks). 
Selling shares to a third party is again an event around which earnings management may be 
beneficial. Acquirers typically perform extensive due diligence on the target company and are 
thus likely to detect the poor earnings quality. They may, however, expect that the earnings of 
a company that is up for sale are managed upwards, following the argument of Shivakumar 
(2000). If the target firm cannot credibly signal the high quality of the reported earnings, 
acquirers will treat all firms equal as having overstated their earnings. This leads acquirers to 
discount the price of all firms up for sale. Firms seeking an exit should therefore overstate 
their current earnings to a level, expected by acquirers. Since acquirers anticipate this 
behavior, no-one is fooled and low earnings quality is a natural outcome of this prisoner’s 
dilemma game (Shivakumar, 2000). Again, as PE investors with high equity stakes have a 
stronger influence on the reported accounting information, they will push to lower earnings 
quality. Hence, Proposition 2 states: 
 
P2:  The quality of the reported earnings of a PE backed company is inversely 
related to the equity percentage a PE investor holds. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE  
The sample consists of a unique hand-collected dataset of financial and non-financial 
data of 270 unquoted Belgian PE backed companies, covering the period 1985-1999. We 
focus on Belgian companies, as all Belgian companies are required by law to make their 
yearly financial statements public, enabling us to study the relation between financial 
reporting quality and PE governance at the time a firm is not publicly listed (yet).2 As the 
accounting information of start-ups is often incomplete or not meaningful, we included only 
firms that were at least two years old when they first received PE. Companies that received 
PE were identified through annual reports of PE investors, investment reports and press 
releases. Financial statements of the sample firms are supplied by the National Bank of 
Belgium and retrieved from Belfirst DVD, a financial database supplied by Bureau Van Dijk. 
The yearly financial statements from the investment year up to maximally 10 years after the 
                                                           
2
 Hellmann and Puri (2002) document that the effect that PE investors have on their portfolio companies is 
strongest when firms are not publicly listed. This dataset provides an excellent opportunity to analyze the under-
explored impact that PE governance has on the financial reporting behavior of their unlisted portfolio firms. 
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investment are used in the analyses. Next to financial statement information, we collect the 
equity stake initially held by the PE investor.3  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the sample firms. Panel A shows the frequency 
distribution of the equity stake of the lead investor. It is clear from Table 1, panel A, that the 
average equity percentage held by PE investors is low, but that there is a high variation with a 
minimum of 5.7% and a maximum of 82.9%. PE equity investors hold less than 20% of the 
shares in almost one in four of the portfolio companies, less than 28% in half of the 
companies, and less than 40% in three quarters of the companies. PE investors hold a majority 
stake of 50% or more in only 1.9% of the sample firms. 
 
Table 1, panel B, shows the distribution of the age of the portfolio companies when 
they received their first PE investment. A substantial number of firms is relatively young. 
10% of the sample firms are only two years old when they received PE, about half of the 
sample firms are less than five years old and about 60% are younger than seven years when 
they receive PE financing for the first time. The variation in age again is large, as almost 30% 
of the firms in the sample are more than 10 years old when receiving PE.  
 
With respect to industry classification (measured by one-digit NACE classification 
and reported in Table 1, panel C), most sample firms are active in metal manufacturing and 
electronic devices (21%), in business services (17%) and in distribution, trade and retail 
(17%). 
 
For the purpose of our analyses, we split the sample into PE backed companies in 
which the PE investor holds relatively low equity stakes (defined as less than 40 %) and those 
in which the PE investor holds relatively high equity stakes (more than 40%). This 
corresponds to comparing the subset of firms in the highest PE ownership quartile compared 
to all other PE backed firms and results in 1,435 (75%) PE-backed companies with low equity 
stakes and 455 (25%) PE-backed companies with high equity stakes. We did sensitivity 
analyses with other cut-offs for low and high equity stakes, which did not alter the results. 
                                                           
3
 We consider the equity stake of the lead investor when more than one PE investor invested in the company. 
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The dummy variable HighEquity% takes a value of 1 if the PE investor holds more than 40% 
of the shares and 0 if the investor holds less than 40% of the shares. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Table 2 shows the variables used in the multivariate analyses, for the two groups of 
low equity percentage and high equity percentage firms. High equity percentage firms are 
significantly smaller (with size measured as total assets) than low equity percentage firms, 
both with respect to mean and median values. This finding is intuitively clear, as it is easiest 
for PE investors to have high equity ownership stakes in smaller firms. Low equity percentage 
firms are significantly older (mean of 14.8 years) than high equity percentage firms (mean of 
13.4 years), although the difference is not important in real terms. The other variables are not 
significantly different between the two subsets of firms: the EBIT, the cash flow, the change 
in profits before and after taxes and the accounting accruals are comparable for low equity 
percentage and high equity percentage firms. 
 
METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
We measure earnings quality through two of its vital attributes: the extent of earnings 
management and the timeliness of loss reporting.  
 
Tests of earnings management  
Consistent with earlier research, we define earnings management as the intentional 
modification of a firm’s performance by insiders to either mislead stakeholders or to influence 
contract terms. Mainstream accounting research measures the extent of earnings management 
through the accruals components in a company’s financial statements. Accruals are 
accounting elements that distinguish a firm’s cash flow from operation from its reported 
earnings. Part of these accruals follow inherently from the growth of business activities, but 
managers have some flexibility in reporting accruals so as to influence the bottom line 
reported earnings (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). Accounting research generally considers 
accruals related to working capital and depreciation policy. By definition, accruals are 
computed as: 
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Accruals = ∆ (Accounts Receivable + Inventory + Other Current Assets) 
    – ∆ (Accounts Payable + Other Current Liabilities) – Depreciation  
 
The basic role of accruals is to mitigate noise in operating cash flow and to construct 
an earnings variable that is less noisy over time than the realized cash flow figure. As a result, 
through the incorporation of accruals, earnings figures should be more closely related to the 
real underlying firm performance than cash flow figures are (Dechow, 1994; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005). Hence, it is clear that accruals and cash flow are both contemporaneously 
and serially negatively correlated over time. However, larger magnitudes of this correlation 
do not reflect a firm’s underlying economic performance and are considered to be a signal of 
earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003). We therefore test the intrinsic relation between 
accruals and cash flow and differentiate our analyses for high versus low equity ownership 
percentages. This results in the following model:  
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with  i = a firm indicator and t = a time indicator 
TA = total accruals  
High Equity% (dummy variable) = 1 if PE investors have equity stake higher than cut-off level, 0 otherwise 
OCF = operational cash flow 
ln(TotalAssets)
 
 = natural logarithm of total assets  
ln(Age) = natural logarithm of the firms’ age 
IND = industry dummies (one-digit sector codes) 
 
Because of the intrinsic negative relation between total accounting accruals and 
operational cash flow, we expect 1β to be significantly negative. Next to the OCF variable, we 
include the HighEquity% dummy and the interaction between the HighEquity% dummy and 
OCF. If there is a difference in earnings management behavior between high and low equity 
ownership firms, this will result in a significant coefficient for 3β  the coefficient of interest. 
A significantly positive coefficient of the interaction term supports Proposition 1, while a 
negative coefficient supports Proposition 2. Further, total assets and age are included as 
control variables, given that the bivariate analyses have shown that companies in which PE 
(1) 
(2) 
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investors have a high equity stake are typically smaller and younger. Finally, IND controls for 
industry fixed effects (one-digit sector codes). 
 
Tests of timely loss recognition 
The second characteristic used to study earnings quality, namely the timeliness of loss 
reporting, is a measure of the conservatism of the reported earnings. Reporting losses in a 
timely manner, rather than spreading the losses over future periods, leads to more 
conservative earnings (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). It is an indicator of earnings quality, 
since conservative financial statements are more reliable for creditors, shareholders, managers 
and other external parties to assess the proper value of the company (Watts, 2003). Following 
the Ball and Shivakumar model (2005), earnings are of a higher quality if bad news is 
reported as a transitory shock (i.e. a one-time dip) in current earnings. We measure timely loss 
reporting in accounting income by focusing on the tendency for income decreases to reverse. 
If prior-period decreases show a higher tendency to reverse than prior-period earnings 
increases, this is evidence of a higher willingness to recognize losses timely and corresponds 
to a higher earnings conservatism. Transitory gain and loss components are estimated by 
following model: 
 
tttttt NININEGNININEGNI εββββ +∆∆+∆+∆+=∆ −−−− 11312110 *)()( , 
 
with:  ∆NIt = income level change at time t, scaled by beginning-of-the-year book value of total assets 
 ∆NIt-1 = income level change at time t-1, scaled by beginning-of-the-year book value of total assets 
 NEG(∆NI)t-1 = dummy variable taking the value of 1 when prior-period earnings changes are negative 
 
By making the estimation model dependent on prior period earnings decreases, we are able to 
study the reversion tendency of losses and gains separately. If losses are recognized in a 
timely manner, then the coefficient (β2 + β3) will be negative. Further, losses are recognized 
in a more timely way than gains if β3 < 0. To test the relationship between the equity 
percentage of the PE investor and timely loss recognition, we supplement model (3) with the 
HighEquity% (HEP) dummy.  
(3) 
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This results in the model (4):  
 
15411312110 )(**)()( −−−−− ∆++∆∆+∆+∆+=∆ tttttt NINEGHEPHEPNININEGNININEGNI βββββα
tttt NININEGHEPNIHEP εββ +∆∆+∆+ −−− 11716 *)(**  
 
with:  ∆NIt = income level change at time t, scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets 
 ∆NIt-1 = income level change at time t-1, scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets 
 NEG(∆NI)t-1 = dummy for prior-period negative income level change 
 HEP = dummy variable = 1 if PE investors have equity stake higher than cut-off level, 0 otherwise 
 
When interpreting the coefficients, we are mainly interested in differences in timely 
loss reporting between companies with high equity percentages of the PE investors and those 
with low equity percentages of the PE investors. Therefore, our discussion will primarily 
focus on β6+β7 which measures the compound effect for differences in timely loss reporting 
between both sub samples. If β6+β7 < 0 (resp. > 0), then HighEquity% companies recognize 
losses more timely (resp. less timely) compared to LowEquity% companies. Remark that, if 
β7 < 0 (resp. > 0), then HighEquity% firms recognize losses more timely (resp. less timely) 
than gains, compared to LowEquity% firms. 
 
MULTIVARIATE FINDINGS 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 3 reports the accruals – cash flow models. Regression (1) models the accruals as 
a function of the operational cash flow and the size and age control variables. In regression 
(2), we condition for high versus low equity percentage firms, without taking the control 
variables into account. Regression (3) is the full model and is similar to regression (2) but 
additionally incorporates the control variables for size and age. All models are highly 
significant. 
 
Table 3 clearly shows that accounting accruals and cash flows are negatively 
correlated. This is consistent with general findings in the accounting literature (e.g. Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005). The coefficient of the interaction term (β2), which is the coefficient of 
(4) 
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interest for our propositions, is significant and negative in all regressions. This supports 
Proposition 2, as it indicates that the accruals of companies in which PE investors hold large 
equity stakes are more negatively related to the operational cash flows than in companies in 
which PE investors hold small equity stakes. Further, the coefficients of the control variables 
(age and size) are significant and positive.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 4 reports the timeliness of loss reporting models. We test for earnings 
conservatism using two different income levels, namely profit before taxes (regressions (1) 
and (2)) and profit after taxes (regressions (3) and (4)). The first and third column show the 
estimation results of the base model (3), while the second and fourth column show the 
estimation of the full model (4) including the HighEquity% (HEP) variables. All models are 
significant and adding the HighEquity% variables significantly improves the fit of the models. 
 
The coefficient of D(∆NI)t-1 x ∆NIt-1, ( 3β ) is significant and negative in Regressions 
(1) and (3), without taking equity percentages into account. This indicates that losses are 
recognized more timely than gains by all firms in the sample. Further, ( 32 ββ + ) is significant 
and negative in Regressions (1) and (3), strengthening the finding of timely recognition of 
losses. When adding the HighEquity% dummy variable and interaction terms in Regression 
(2) and (4), 7β  is significantly positive, indicating that high equity percentage companies 
recognize losses less timely than gains, compared to low equity percentage companies. 
Results hold for both profit before and after taxes. This finding again supports Proposition 2: 
companies in which PE investors hold a large equity stake recognize losses less timely than 
those with a small equity stake.  
 
Both the accruals-cash flow and the timeliness of loss reporting analyses support 
Proposition 2 rather than Proposition 1, suggesting that the quality of reported earnings is 
higher for companies in which PE investors have a low equity stake. 
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The governance and shareholder structure of an unquoted company has impact on how 
that company functions (Cowling, 2003). We have provided further evidence on how 
shareholders impact one aspect of the professionalization of a portfolio company, namely the 
quality of its financial accounts provided to the outside community. While previous research 
has shown that the quality of the financial accounts of an unquoted company significantly 
improves when a PE investor becomes a shareholder, our study provides evidence that the 
equity percentage held by the PE investor has a moderating impact on the quality of the 
financial accounts. The quality improvement is lower when the PE investor holds a large 
equity stake, while it is higher when the PE investor holds a small equity stake. More 
precisely, the earnings management is larger and the timeliness of the reported losses is lower 
in portfolio companies in which PE investors hold a large equity stake, compared to those in 
companies in which PE investors hold a smaller equity stake.  
 
We interpret this as evidence that the quality of the financial accounts of an unquoted 
company and the proportional equity stake of an external PE investors are substitutes rather 
than complements. Although having a PE investor as a shareholder results in high earnings 
quality on average, a higher PE equity stake typically corresponds to higher monitoring and 
control efforts and substitutes for the need of high earnings quality. Pursuing a high earnings 
quality reporting strategy might be beneficial in prospect of a future (trade) sale, but results in 
a higher probability of missing short term earnings targets. As a consequence, financing costs 
are typically higher and the probability of getting additional financing may decrease. 
Professional PE investors are aware of the costs associated with this strategy and might 
attempt to substitute for this quality signal. The current results indicate that the proportional 
equity stake a PE investor holds, as an indicator of their monitoring impact, serves as a 
substitute for an – often expensive – high earnings quality reporting strategy.  
 
This finding is important for external stakeholders that intensively rely on financial 
accounts of companies in their decision making process. These include parties such as banks, 
who often rely on the financial accounts for their loan granting decisions, suppliers, customers 
and employees, but also new later-round equity investors or acquirers. These parties all should 
realize that the quality of the reported financial performance should not be taken at face value. 
Although the quality of the accounting figures of PE backed companies is, in general, better 
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than that of comparable companies that are not backed by PE investors, it is further important 
to know the percentage of the equity held by the PE investor. Higher equity stakes are 
associated with lower quality of the reported earnings. 
 
Our study has some limitations. First, we focus on the reporting quality of Belgian PE 
backed companies. Belgium has a bank-centered financial system; therefore, the results may 
not be transferable to economies with a more equity-centered financial system such as the UK 
or the US. However, this Belgian institutional context is unique since it allows to do 
accounting quality analyses on unquoted PE backed companies. This is a subset of firms that 
have largely been neglected in the accounting literature, given the difficulties of getting these 
data in other countries. Further, since we looked at quality attributes of the financial accounts 
of unquoted companies, we could only focus on two attributes of this quality. These attributes 
are, however, very important earnings quality attributes. Third, the nature of the data 
prevented more fine-grained analyses. For example, a more direct measurement of the 
monitoring efforts of the PE firm and its impact on the reporting quality of the portfolio 
company might yield additional insights. Nevertheless, the present study provided one more 
piece of hard evidence on how PE investors influence the professionalization of their portfolio 
companies. 
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TABLE 1 
Characteristics of sample companies (N=270) 
Panel A: Frequencies of ownership percentage of the lead PE investor 
OWNERSHIP % Percentage of sample firms Cumulative percentage of sample firms 
Minimum 5.7 - 
5% < X < 10% 6.8 6.8 
10% < X < 20% 17.9 24.7 
20% < X < 25% 20.1 44.8 
25% < X < 30% 16.1 60.9 
30% < X < 40% 15.0 75.9 
40% < X < 50% 22.2 98.1 
50% < X < 60% 1.2 99.3 
> 60% 0.7 100.0 
Maximum 82.8 - 
 
Panel B: Age of the portfolio company at initial PE investment 
AGE in years Percentage of sample firms Cumulative percentage of sample firms 
2 10.0 10.0 
2 < X < 3 25.2 35.2 
3 < X < 4 10.5 45.7 
4 < X < 5 6.7 52.4 
5 < X < 7  8.2 60.6 
7 < X < 10 11.2 71.8 
More than 10 29.2 100.0 
 
Panel C: Industry concentration of portfolio companies (Top 3 Broad Sector Definitions) 
INDUSTRY  N Percentage 
Metal Manufacture and Electronic Devices 57 21.2 
Business Services 46 17.1 
Distribution, Trades and Retail 46 17.1 
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TABLE 2 
Summary statistics of variables across high and low equity ownership firms 
 
 
Sample N Mean*** Median*** Min. Max. 5th Percentile 95th Percentile 
 
Highperc. = 1 
 
455 
 
10,390,369*** 
 
2,233,099*** 
 
126,475 
 
212,540,065 
 
240,977 
 
45,234,941 
 
Total assets 
 
 
Highperc. = 0 1435 15,904,701*** 4,859,283*** 127,513 260,130,838 407,710 61,903,698 
Highperc. = 1 455 13.41*** 10.00*** 2.00 74.00 3.00 31.00 Age 
 
 
Highperc. = 0 1435 14.81*** 11.00*** 2.00 71.00 3.00 38.00 
Highperc. = 1 455 0.038*** 0.039*** -0.572 0.683 -0.124 0.172 EBIT 
 
 
Highperc. = 0 1435 0.042*** 0.044*** -0.847 0.971 -0.156 0.198 
Highperc. = 1 455 -0.067*** -0.065*** -0.659 0.442 -0.331 0.182 Accruals 
 
 
Highperc. = 0 1435 -0.071*** -0.059*** -0.714 0.616 -0.347 0.167 
Highperc. = 1 455 0.076*** 0.070*** -0.606 0.588 -0.187 0.321 Cash Flow 
 
 
Highperc. = 0 1435 0.086*** 0.082*** -0.681 0.672 -0.173 0.349 
Highperc. = 1 455 0.018*** 0.001*** -0.463 0.890 -0.149 0.199 ∆ (Profit Before Taxes) 
 
 
Highperc. = 0 1435 0.013*** 0.002*** -0.460 0.677 -0.189 0.252 
Highperc. = 1 455 0.008*** 0.001*** -0.463 0.678 -0.150 0.192 ∆ (Profit After Taxes) 
 
 
Highperc. = 0 1435 0.011*** 0.002*** -0.460 0.677 -0.181 0.236 
Note: Differences between sample means (medians) are measured with a two-tailed t–test (Mann Whitney U test). ***  denotes statistical significance at the 1% confidence level, 
** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
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TABLE 3 
Multivariate OLS Regressions: Accruals – Cash Flow relation 
Dependent Variable: Accruals Regression (1) Regression (2) 
 
Regression (3) 
 
         
 
Intercept
 
 
 
-0.144*** 
 
(-3.85) 
  
-0.038*** 
 
(1.47) 
  
-0.145 *** 
 
(-3.83) 
OCF 
 
-0.691*** (-43.07)  -0.662*** (-36.20)  -0.669*** (-37.08) 
High Equity% 
 
/   0.001*** (0.92)  0.007*** (1.04) 
High Equity% x OCF 
 
/   -0.099*** (-2.51)  -0.105*** (-2.65) 
Log(Total Assets) 
 
0.005*** (3.06)  /   0.005 *** (3.02) 
Log(Age) 
 
0.019*** (5.32)  /   0.019*** (5.36) 
 
Sector dummies 
 
Included***  Included***  Included*** 
      
Adjusted R²  0.506***   0.493***   0.508*** 
F-statistic   174.67***   166.17***   148.77*** 
Sample size  1,890***   1,890***   1,890*** 
 
Regression (1) tests for the relation between accruals and cash flow without conditioning the sample for high and low equity percentage firms. Regression (2) tests for 
differences in this accruals – cash flow relation between high and low equity percentage firms and Regression (3) additionally controls for Size and Age. Note: ***  statistical 
significant at the 1% confidence level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 4 
Multiple OLS Regressions: Timeliness of Loss Reporting 
 
 
Net Income Level = Profit Before Taxes 
 
Net Income Level = Profit After Taxes 
Dependent Variable:  
∆(Net Income) Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) 
 
Regression (4) 
 
            
 
Intercept
 
 
 
0.022*** 
 
(0.48) 
  
0.021*** 
 
(0.44) 
  
0.027*** 
 
(0.60) 
  
0.028*** 
 
(0.59) 
D(∆NI)t-1                (β1) 
 
-0.011*** (-1.46)  -0.007*** (-0.84)  -0.012*** (-1.67)  -0.009*** (-1.16) 
∆NIt-1                            (β2) 
 
-0.063*** (-2.31)  -0.023*** (-0.73)  -0.064*** (-2.41)  -0.023*** (-0.75) 
D(∆NI)t-1 x ∆NIt-1              (β3) 
 
-0.547*** (-9.75)  -0.599*** (-9.46)  -0.582*** (-10.59)  -0.645*** (-10.39) 
DHighEquity%           (β4) 
 
/   0.016*** (1.35)  /   0.013*** (1.13) 
DHighEquity% x D(∆NI)t-1 (β5) 
 
/   -0.015*** (-0.91)  /   -0.010*** (-0.61) 
DHighEquity%x ∆NIt-1       (β6) 
 
/   -0.173*** (-2.76)  /   -0.174*** (-2.86) 
DHighEquity% 
x D(∆NI)t-1 x ∆NIt-1           (β7) 
 
/   0.228*** (1.77)  /   0.267*** (2.12) 
Log(Total Assets)         (β8) 
 
-0.003*** (-0.09)  -0.002*** (-1.29)  -0.003*** (-1.38)  -0.003*** (-1.29) 
Log(Age)               (β9) 
 
0.007*** (1.50)  0.007*** (1.52)  0.007*** (1.54)  0.007*** (1.53) 
 
Sector dummies 
 
Included***  Included***  Included***  Included*** 
Adjusted R²  0.097***   0.107***   0.109***   0.111*** 
F-statistic   16.65***   13.22***   18.77***   14.92*** 
Sample size  1,890***   1,890***   1,890***   1,890*** 
 
Table 4 presents regression results on the timeliness of loss reporting. Regression (1) and (2) relate to profit before taxes as dependent variable while Regression (3) and (4) 
relate to profit after taxes. Estimates of the base model (3) are reported in column 1 and 3, while estimates of the full model (4) are reported in column 2 and 4 . Note: ***  
statistical significant at the 1% confidence level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level 
 
